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Vital software: Formal method and coded processor 
Daniel Dollé1 
1: Siemens Transportation Systems, 50 rue Barbès 92542 Montrouge Cedex France 
 
 
 
Abstract: Siemens Transportation Systems has 
been developing mass transit systems for 30 years 
and for more than 10 years it has used the B formal 
method to develop and validate its safety critical 
software. With B, the software is derived stepwise 
from an abstract mathematical specification and 
formal proof ensures that each intermediate step is 
equivalent to the previous one. With the Vital Coded 
Processor, any run time error caused either by a 
compiler error or a hardware failure is detected and 
the unit is set in a safe state. A high level of 
productivity is achieved through the use of a tool that 
derives semi-automatically the code from the formal 
specification. 
Keywords: automatic subways, formal specification, 
safety critical software, arithmetic coding 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The company 
Siemens Transportation Systems is the international 
expertise centre of Siemens for automated mass 
transit systems. It is also the supplier in France of 
the products and services of the “Transportation 
Systems” group of Siemens AG.  
1.2 Urban transit 
An urban railway system is made of three main 
parts: the command centre, the car-borne controllers 
and the zone controllers. 
The command centre supervises the line and 
regulates train traffic. It usually has no safety critical 
mission. 
The zone controller manages a section of the line: it 
tracks the trains running on its section and sends 
them movement authorities that depend on the 
position of the other trains and the state of the 
lineside equipment (switches, signals, etc.). 
The car-borne controllers manage the train’s 
propulsion according to its mission and to the 
instructions received from the zone controllers. They 
also open and close the train doors. If platforms are 
equipped with screen doors, the trains and the zone 
controllers open and close them collaboratively. 
The wayside and carborne controllers perform vital 
functions in software. In order to ensure the very 
high safety level required for these functions, 
Siemens Transportation Systems (STS) uses two 
complementary techniques: 
• The B method [1] is a formal method for the 
specification, design and coding of software. B 
ensures that the source code implements the 
specification without any error. 
• The Vital Coded Processor [2] ensures that the 
executables can cause no harm even in the 
case of hardware failures or defects in the 
compiler. 
 
1.3. Vital software 
The challenge of developing safety critical railway 
functions in software was met early on with specific 
technologies. 
SACEM: In the ‘80s, the consortium [3] in charge of 
building the SACEM (Système d’Aide à la Conduite, 
à l’Exploitation et à la Maintenance) for the Paris 
metro authority developed the Vital Coded Processor 
to protect software execution against hardware and 
compilation errors. This technique is powerless 
against design error and classical validation through 
testing was deemed insufficient. A formal (i.e. 
mathematical) approach was therefore used. 
• The source code (in Modula II) was enriched 
with pre and postconditions that were then 
verified semi-automatically. 
• The specification of the software was rewritten in 
a formal language. 
• The consistency of the formal specification and 
of the annotated code was checked manually. 
This validation proved to be extremely costly 
because it had been done after a classical 
development. For the following Paris automatic 
subway, Météor, a formal development was 
required. 
Météor: Opened to the public in 1998, Météor [4] is a 
driverless system that allows mixed traffic: trains 
without carborne controllers may run at the same 
time as equipped trains. Météor was the first 
application of the B method and it proved remarkably 
successful: all the errors were found during the 
development and the validation process was done 
efficiently without unit tests. 
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2. Formal development process 
2.1 Organisation 
The development of safety critical software would 
classically be organised in a development team, a 
test team and a safety team. The responsibility of the 
safety team is to ensure that the software never 
compromises the safety of the system. The 
organisation of a formal development is very similar, 
we simply added a team of formal method specialists 
in order to provide method and tool support. 
Formal support team: The mission of the formal 
support team is to collect and disseminate best 
practices. 
• It maintains the “B development Guide”. This 
document is a methodological repository where 
we collect the experience of our formal projects. 
• It provides tool and method support to the 
developers and ensures by means of technical 
reviews that the B models are provable and 
efficient. 
• It may participate in critical parts of the 
development and coach new developers. 
As most of our team now have experienced B 
developers, the role of the formal development team 
is becoming less crucial. 
Development team: The development team carries 
out all the activities going from the writing of the 
software specification to the software target 
integration. 
• It writes the software specifications. 
• It formalises the specification in an abstract 
model. 
• It refines the abstract model in order to obtain 
code that can be translated into a classical 
programming language. 
• It proves all the proof obligations required by the 
B method. 
• It produces the Ada code of the software. This 
code is either automatically translated from B 
implementations or manually written for the low-
level input/output primitives of the application. 
Test team: The test team defines and implements 
the tests that software must pass. 
Validation team: The validation team is independent 
of the other teams and analyses each of the 
intermediate productions of the development team. 
Its goal is to identify early any defect that could lead 
to a dangerous situation. 
• It validates the software specification. 
• It checks that all the vital requirements of the 
software specification are captured in the 
abstract model. 
• It checks the Ada code of the parts of the 
application that are not developed formally. 
• It validates the interactive proofs. 
• It specifies and implements its own tests of the 
vital requirements. 
These activities may result in problem reports that 
have to be corrected by the development team. 
 
2.2 An overview of the B language 
B is a formal language invented by Jean-Raymond 
Abrial. Close to other formal language such as Z and 
VDM, B covers the full development cycle and is 
suitable for large scale developments. Is main 
characteristics are: 
• B has a mathematical basis that is both powerful 
and easy to learn: elementary set theory and 
ordinary two-valued predicate logic. 
• Proofs are at the heart of B: every property that 
is expressed in a B model must be proved. 
• B gives the developer a uniform view of the 
formal specification and its code: the same 
notation is used for both. 
• The B model is made of modules that provide 
data and operations on these data. A module is 
further divided into: a Machine, a Refinement 
and an Implementation. The machine gives the 
external view of the module: it shows only what 
is needed by users of the module. The 
refinement gives the internal view of the module: 
it specifies completely the behaviour of the 
module. Machines and refinements are abstract 
components: a data can be a set or a relation. 
An implementation, on the other hand, is 
concrete: it is directly translatable into a classical 
language and its data structures are very limited 
(integer, booleans and arrays). 
• B is fully supported by a tool: the “Atelier B” [5]. 
 
2.3 Development cycle 
The classical development cycle is split into the 
following phases: specification design, coding and 
test. The use of B implies some modification, they 
are detailed below. 
Software specification: The software is specified in a 
text document organized along the principles of 
functional analysis (SADT). The aim of this 
document is to state clearly and rigorously what the 
software has to do, it uses whatever notation is best 
suited to that purpose: natural language, state 
automata or B formulas. The software specification 
prepares the formalisation phase, it should identify 
the following items: 
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• The data represent the states of the software, 
the input/output of the functions that specify it or 
its configuration. 
• The processing specifies how a function 
computes its outputs from its inputs and how it 
modifies its internal states. 
• The properties are logical assertions that either 
express safety properties or simply clarify the 
processing. 
• The hypotheses are assumptions about the 
environment of the software. 
• The limitations give the scope of validity of the 
data. 
All those items will later be found in the B model. 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of the classical and formal 
development cycle 
Formalisation: The goal of the formalisation is to 
express in B the content of the software 
specification. This phases ends when all the 
requirements have been captured in the abstract 
model. Ideally, it can then be refined without knowing 
the textual software specification. 
The development of the abstract model is 
constrained by technical sub-goals: 
• Checking the compliance of the formal model 
with respect to the software specification should 
be easy. 
• The proof should be easy. 
• The abstract model should not unduly constrain 
the coding. 
The means to fulfil these sub-goals are: 
• Respect the functional architecture of the 
software specification. 
• Divide complex problems into smaller problems 
that can be treated separately. 
• Keep the number of B implementations to a 
minimum. It should be noted that it has a twofold 
effect. Implementations are poorly readable 
because they cannot use the concise 
mathematical notation that is allowed in 
machines and refinements. Furthermore, since 
all the implementations are directly translated 
into code, they have to take into account 
efficiency constraints. 
Depending on the complexity of the function to be 
formalised, a module can be a single machine, a 
machine and its refinement or a machine, its 
implementation and one or more machines. In all 
cases, the machine formalises the part of the 
requirements that is needed for the outside of the 
module. For instance: “the speed of the train is lower 
than a limit”. 
• If the requirement is simple, it can formalised in 
a single machine. For instance: “the speed of the 
train is lower than a limit for the whole line”. 
• If the requirement is more complex, a refinement 
is added to the machine. For instance: “the 
speed of the train is lower than one limit on the 
mainline and lower than another limit in the yard. 
• If the requirement is still more complex, an 
implementation is added to the machine. This 
implementation divides the requirements in 
smaller requirements that are treated separately. 
For instance: “the speed of the train is lower 
than a limit that depends on the slope at the 
position of the train, the limit can be modified by 
an operator on work zones”. In this case the 
implementation would divide the problem into 
two modules that would compute the train 
position and handle the operator requests. 
The different items of the textual specification can be 
found in the abstract model: 
• The data are the variables and constants. 
• The treatments are the operations. 
• The properties are either the invariants of B 
components or the postconditions of operations. 
• The hypotheses are either modelling choices or 
postconditions of the operations that interface 
the formal software with its environment. 
• The limitations are the preconditions of read 
operations. 
Refinement: The goal of the refinement phase is to 
produce the concrete model. It contains the abstract 
model as well as the implementation of all the 
components that were not previously implemented. 
The following principles apply to this phase: 
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Preliminary  
design 
Detailed 
design 
Proof 
Proof Unit tests 
Integration 
tests 
Functional 
tests 
Preliminary 
design document 
Detailed 
design document 
Ada 
code 
Abstract Model 
Concrete Model  
Ada code 
Classical development Formal development 
Informal document Formal document 
Coding 
Formalisation 
Translation 
Automatic or automatically checked 
activity 
Manual activity 
Refinement 
Software 
specification 
Software 
specification 
Legend: 
Functional 
tests 
ERTS 2006 – 25-27 January 2006 – Toulouse Page 4/8 
• Except in the case of technical limitations, all the 
B components should be implemented. 
• The constraints coming from coding efficiency 
and memory consumption should be taken into 
account. 
• The difficulty of proof should be kept under 
control. 
The refinement brings the abstract model down to 
code: the sets and relations of the model must be 
transformed into arrays, the non deterministic 
constructions of B must be transformed into classical 
control structure (IF and CASE). If these 
transformations are carried out simultaneously (each 
machine or refinement is refined into a single 
implementation) the resulting proofs can be 
extremely difficult. The recommended practice is to 
refine the control structures first and to refine the 
data later on. 
Nowadays, the refinement is automated and the 
developer can concentrate on the new refinement 
schemes that the tool cannot yet refine and on the 
run time optimisations. 
Proof of the B model: The B model is proved at the 
same time as it is developed. The goal of the activity 
is to demonstrate that each component is consistent 
and that it does not contradict the abstraction it 
refines. The first step of the proof is to compute all 
the proof obligations foreseen by the B-Book [1], it is 
done entirely automatically by the Atelier B. The 
second step is the actual demonstration of the proof 
obligations. The Atelier B provides an automatic 
prover that discharges up to 90 % of the proof 
obligations. The remainder is proved interactively: 
the developer can both drive directly the behaviour 
of the prover and add new proof rules. For the 
Météor project we added about 1200 proof rules to 
the internal rule base of the prover. These rules are 
checked by the validation team in order to ensure 
integrity of the proof. 
Compilation: As there is no compiler for B, the 
implementations must be translated into a classical 
programming language. In our case this is done 
entirely automatically and the target language is a 
subset of Ada. 
Validation of the vital software: Validating the 
software consists in ensuring that is execution fulfils 
the requirements identified in the software 
specification. The validation of software developed 
with B goes through the following steps: 
• The consistency between the abstract model 
and the software specification is ensured by 
functional tests and by an analysis of the model 
that is carried out by the RAMS team. Ideally, 
the functional tests should be done early in the 
development and use only the abstract model. In 
practice they use the Ada code coming the 
concrete model. 
• The consistency between the abstract and the 
concrete model is proved. 
• The consistency between the B implementations 
and the Ada code is ensured by the use of two 
diversified translators. An analysis by the RAMS 
team guarantees that the Ada code of the 
machines that are not implemented in B is 
actually a refinement of these machines and it 
satisfies the requirements. 
• The consistency between the Ada code and its 
execution is ensured by the Vital Coded 
Processor [2]. 
Some points worth noticing: As the abstract B model 
captures all the vital requirements of the software 
specification, the RAMS team can validate the 
software without analysing the concrete model. 
Similarly, all the system-level properties of the model 
are in its abstract part, the concrete model only 
contains code-level properties. 
Since the goal of the tests is to detect modelling 
errors, the reference for the tests is the software 
specification and not the abstract model.  
We have no unit tests, they would check that the 
code conforms with the detailed design and this is 
already done by the proof. 
In the classical life-cycle, the validation is based on 
testing and can thus only start after the coding. In a 
B development it starts during the formalisation 
phase: the developers prove the abstract model 
before they start refining it. 
The limits of B: There is no B construct to express 
explicitly real time constraints. They can nonetheless 
be modelled under the hypothesis that the software 
is periodically activated. In our case, the hardware 
vitally ensures a constant periodicity for software 
activation. 
Likewise B has no construct for input/output or for 
file access. These functions are modelled using a 
machine that is implemented directly in Ada. 
A further limitation is that B handles no other 
numbers than integers. We model real numbers as 
fixed points and handle the necessary scaling factors 
explicitly.  
 
2.4 Safety techniques 
The B method ensures that the implementations 
comply with the abstract model. It is also necessary 
to ensure that the software execution complies with 
the B code. Our technology cannot prevent run time 
errors but, since our equipments have a safe state 
(no traction power for a wayside equipment and 
stopped train for an onboard equipment) we can 
guarantee that the system will either function 
correctly or go into a safe state. We use two 
techniques for that purpose the Vital Coded 
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Processor (VCP) and the redundancy of the B/Ada 
translation. 
The Vital Coded Processor: The Vital Coded 
Processor uses a probabilistic approach to detect 
inconsistencies between software source code and 
its execution. Each data of the software has two 
parts: 32 bits of functional information and N 
redundant bits. The overall safety level achieved 
depends on N but not on the technology used. It is, 
for instance, independent of the hardware reliability 
and no validation of the compilation tools is 
necessary. The redundant part is the sum of three 
terms: 
• An arithmetic encoding of the functional value 
detects data alteration in memory or during their 
copy. 
• A signature detects instructions executed in an 
incorrect sequence. As this signature is static, 
independent of the functional information, it can 
be pre-computed off-line. 
• A time-stamp for each computation cycle 
ensures that the previous value of a variable 
cannot be used after an update. 
After giving a signature to each input variable, the 
Signature Predetermination Tool (SPT) analyses the 
source code and computes the expected signatures 
for the output variables. These pre-computed 
signatures are then embedded in the executable. 
A run time, the data are computed using a library of 
elementary operations (arithmetic, test condition 
computation, loops, etc.) that updates both the 
information and redundant parts. At the end of each 
computing cycle, a failsafe hardware component 
called the dynamical controller compares the actual 
value of the signatures with their actual value. In 
case of discrepancy, the dynamical controller puts 
the equipment in a safe state. For efficiency reasons, 
this comparison is not done for each variable but for 
a single variable that is built to have the property that 
it “collects” every error: as long as the computation 
cycle is less than 2N operations, an error in any 
variable is detected with a probability 1 – 2-N. As in 
our implementation of the VPC 2N is roughly equal to 
1014, for all practical purpose we are certain to detect 
any error. 
The safety provided by the VPC relies on the 
diversity of the source code analysis done by the 
compiler and the SPT. We assume that there is no 
common failure mode because they have been 
developed independently (different teams and 
languages). 
B/Ada translation: The VPC ensures that the 
software runs correctly with respect to its source 
code. It is also necessary to guarantee that the 
source code is correct with respect to the B 
implementation that it translates. We use two 
translators for that purpose: they have been 
developed fully redundantly (teams, design and 
programming language were different) on a common 
specification. 
 
 
Figure 2: Translating B to Ada 
As shown in figure 2, we use the VPC to compare 
Ada source codes: one set of source files is 
compiled and the other is analysed by the SPT. Any 
error (in the translator, the compiler, the linker or at 
run time) will result in a difference between the pre-
computed signatures and the signatures and their 
run-time value.  
 
3. Tools for the B method 
3.1 Commercial tools: Atelier B 
The core tool for formal development at Siemens 
Transportation Systems is the Atelier B. This 
product, developed and marketed by ClearSy [5], 
supports all the features needed to manage an 
industrial-scale formal development and to rigorously 
apply the B method. 
• The model can be structured and teamwork is 
supported. In our case, the typical size of our 
applications is: five hundred files, a few hundred 
thousands line of B model, a few tens of 
thousands of proof obligations, 10 to 15 sub-
models, formal development teams of up to 10 
persons. 
• The features available for the B method are: 
static checks of the B files (syntax and type 
checks, visibility rule checks, etc.), proof 
B 
implementations 
Ada code 1 Ada code 2 
Object code Reference 
signatures
Executable 
Translator 1 Translator 2 
Compiler SPT 
Linker 
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obligation generation, automatic and interactive 
proof, translation of the B implementations into 
Ada. 
 
3.2 Proprietary tools: EdithB 
STS has developed many tools that enhance the 
efficiency of formal development, the most significant 
is an automatic refiner called EdithB. 
The problem: A typical beginner’s mistake is to 
implement simultaneously an abstract variable and 
the operations on this variable. This results in 
complex proof because abstract processing on 
abstract variables must be checked against concrete 
processing on concrete variables. An experienced B 
developer will proceed differently: 
• Intermediate implementations are used to refine 
the operation one step at a time. 
• Variables are refined last. 
The resulting architecture looks like: 
 
Figure 4: A typical refinement architecture 
In such an architecture the variables of A0, ..., An are 
abstract. It is only in A_impn that the variables are 
implemented. Similarly, each operation Opi of Ai is 
implemented in A_impi with a sequence of 
operations call to operations in Ai+1: Opi1, ..., Opim. 
Since each of the new operations Opij only uses 
abstract data, it easy to prove that they refine Opi. A 
drawback of this technique is that it is very repetitive: 
each new machine repeats piecewise information 
that was present in the previous machine. 
Météor: One of the key results of the Météor project 
was the identification of a very small number (less 
than 10) of standard data refinement schemes. 
Using a small number of refinement schemes led to 
a great uniformity of coding style that eased the 
review process and reduced the number of proof 
rules that had to be written (a proof rule useful for a 
given use of the refinement scheme was likely to be 
reusable for another instance of this refinement 
scheme). 
The solution: These refinement schemes were first 
collected in a “B Method Guide” and used during the 
development and review process of our models. 
Later, they were implemented as rewriting rules in 
our automatic refinement tool. The tool takes as 
input an abstract B component (a machine or a 
refinement) and produces an implementation of this 
component. As this implementation may import a 
new machine, the process is iterated until a terminal 
implementation is produced. 
Principles: EdithB is made of two parts: a rule base 
and an interpreter for this rule base. The interpreter 
is a stable software that has not changed much 
since its creation in 1999. The rule base is dedicated 
to our applications: it can only refine the B constructs 
that we use. It is a growing body that has been 
enriched in the course of our successive formal 
developments. The result is that, even though we 
may not always be reusing code directly, we are 
reusing the expertise that went into its writing. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
 
Figure 5: Number of refinement rules 
An example: The rule base can be divided into two 
parts: rules for the refinement of variables and rules 
for the refinement of instructions. Their respective 
behaviour will be explained with an example. 
• To refine an abstract variable one has to define 
the concrete variable that implements it and how 
both are related (the “gluing” invariant). A 
simplified example of variable refinement rule is 
shown below. 
RULE set_variable IS 
   ABSTRACT_VARIABLE a 
   TYPE integer_set(a,n) 
   INVARIANT 
      a ⊂ 1..n 
CONCRETE_VARIABLE 
Machine A0 
Implementation A_imp0 
Machine A1 
Implementation A_imp1 
Machine An 
Implementation A_impn 
IMPORTS 
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   a_r 
INVARIANT 
   a_r ∈ 1..n → BOOLEAN & 
   a = a_r-1[{TRUE}] 
END 
The abstract variable “a” is a set of integers, it is 
implemented with an array of booleans called 
“a_r” and the gluing is that “a” is exactly the set 
of indexes for which “a_r” is TRUE. 
A theoretical limit of our tool is that it chooses 
the refinement of a variable without taking into 
account how this variable is used. As a 
consequence, it chooses the most general 
refinement, the one that works for every 
conceivable use of the variable. In the example 
above, if only the maximum of “a” is ever 
accessed, it is more efficient to refine “a” with 
a_max = max(a). In our experience, this limit is 
not significant. 
• The rules that refine instructions work within a 
context defined by the variable refinements and 
by the hypotheses that are at the point of 
refinement. Let us suppose we wish to refine the 
assignment to “my_set” that is inside the IF: 
INVARIANT 
   my_set ⊂ 1..99 
OPERATIONS 
  my_operations = 
    IF 3 ∈ my_set THEN 
      my_set := my_set ∪ {my_var} 
    END 
The context available to an instruction 
refinement rule contains: integer_set(my_set,99) 
(coming from the variable refinement rule we 
saw previously) and 3 ∈ my_set. 
• With this context the following rule would apply: 
RULE assign_set_variable IS 
WHEN integer_set(a,n) 
REFINE 
   a := a ∪ {b} 
INTO 
   local_variable_1 := b; 
   IMPLEMENTATION( 
      a_r(local_variable_1) := TRUE) 
END 
This rules copies b into a local variable and then 
updates the array that refines the set. As the 
second statement need not be refined further, it 
is marked as an implementation. The first 
statement is not marked, so it could be refined 
further. This could useful be useful if b were 
instantiated with a complex expression but in our 
case b is just “my_var”, so the resulting 
expression would simply be: 
   l_1 := my_var; 
   my_set_r(l_1) := TRUE; 
Interactive refinement: The automatic refiner has an 
interactive mode where the context and applicable 
rules of each refinement step can be examined. This 
mode is used in two situations. 
• EdithB can fail to find any rule matching the 
current context. 
• The refined code is incorrect or not efficient 
enough. 
In both cases, the developer debugs the refinement 
in interactive mode and writes the rules that give the 
desired refinement. These rules can then be stored 
for use on the current B machine or, more rarely, 
they can be added to the rule base if they are 
deemed reusable. 
Validation of EdithB: Since the B components it 
produces are proved, no safety validation is needed 
for the refiner. 
EdithB in use: When we built EdithB in 1999, we 
compared its output to the manually written code of a 
previous formal project. There was a small increase 
in code size but no significant effect on computation 
time. The expected savings in development time led 
us to generalise it for all of our formal software since 
that time. It is now a fundamental part of our 
software development process. The following 
diagram shows the proportion of automatically 
generated B code for a project that is currently 
nearing completion (the scale is in kilo-lines of 
uncommented B). 
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20000
40000
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80000
100000
Machines &
refinements
Implementations
 
Figure 6: Canarsie Line carborne controller 
Since only the implementations are translated into 
Ada code, around 2/3 of this provably correct 
application is produced automatically. 
ERTS 2006 – 25-27 January 2006 – Toulouse Page 8/8 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has given a short overview of the 
development of safety critical software at STS. The 
technical heart of our process is the B method and 
the Vital Coded Processor. A highly automated 
development process defined around B allows us to 
build error-free source code in a cost efficient way. 
The VCP ensures that this source code runs safely 
on the computer platform without any safety 
requirement on the CPU. We can thus guarantee 
rigorously that no defect is introduced between the 
formal specification of the software and its execution. 
The whole process is the result of two decades of 
progressive improvements. It is fully consistent with 
the requirement for vital functions inside an 
industrial/product organisation. 
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8. Glossary 
CBTC Communications Based Train Control 
EdithB Automatic refinement tool 
RAMS Reliability Availability Maintainability and Safety 
STS Siemens Transportation Systems 
VCP Vital Coded Processor 
